Political Fiction Meets Gender Myth: Post?conflict Reconstruction, “Democratisation” and Women's Rights by Kandiyoti, Deniz
In her summary of important points to retain from
the ‘Gender Myths and Feminist Fables’ workshop,
Anne Marie Goetz made a useful distinction between
the politics of development with a capital ‘P’ and
feminism as micropolitics that aims, among other
things, to push for institutional changes that further
greater equity. An overriding preoccupation,
expressed throughout the workshop, concerns the
nature of the varied obstacles standing in the way
of a feminist practice in development. It was argued
that these obstacles range from selective
appropriations of gender concepts by various
international aid bureaucracies to the
“domestication” of feminist agenda (and of
“technologies” such as gender training), to the effects
of global neo-liberal policies that have altered the
terrain upon which claims to rights and entitlements
could be articulated. It is possible to detect two
parallel strands running through these discussions:
one is an “internal” critique of how various concepts
and approaches generated in the course of scholarly
engagement with gender and development issues
have fared in practice, the other is an evaluation of
how changing global economic and political
conjunctures are modifying the very terms of the
debates we engage in. I would like to situate this
brief intervention into the latter strand, namely, an
interrogation of the effects of politics with a capital
‘P’.
Gender issues are becoming politicised in novel
and counterproductive ways in a geopolitical
context where armed interventions usher in new
blueprints for governance underwritten by
international donors and global institutions. The
cases I have in mind have entered our political
lexicon under the somewhat misleading label of
“failed states”. These often refer to war-torn societies
with collapsed, decayed or vestigial apparatuses of
governance whose political economies are driven
by the arms trade, drug trafficking or other forms
of illegal trade in primary commodities such as
diamonds, oil or cocaine. These states are now
augmented, in the case of Iraq, by the casualties of
a new policy of armed democratisation and regime
change.
I am less concerned with the effects of “gender
myths” that have grown out of decades of feminist
engagement with development policy and practice,
than by the impact of the watersheds represented
by the September 11th attacks on the USA and the
subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.1 The
difficulties of developing a principled feminist
response (and an appropriate politics of solidarity)
in the face of these developments are self-evident.
Even for those welcoming change, the trinity of
democratisation, good governance and women’s
rights can be turned into poisoned gifts under new
forms of global trusteeship.
There are several aspects of this new conjuncture
that invite us to reflect on a search for appropriate
responses. First, there is a new conventional wisdom
concerning the need to include women in post-
conflict reconstruction, backed by UN Security
Council Resolution 1325. The recognition of both
the suffering of women caught up in conflicts and
their potential as vital actors for a transition to peace
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is undoubtedly a welcome development. However,
in the absence of consistent policies to transform
war economies into sustainable livelihoods offering
minimal standards of security, this new attention
to women is likely to open itself to the types of
criticism encountered previously when women
were hailed as the managers of poverty or of
deteriorating natural environments. Second, the
type of social transformation agenda implicit in
global neo-liberal governance, as applied to state-
building, has to be interrogated from a gender
perspective. The notion that democratisation is co-
terminous with an expansion of women’s rights
needs to be examined more closely in different
contexts2 as do the intended and unintended effects
of donor interventions in this domain.
Using the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan
(where reversing abuses of women’s rights has been
an explicit item of policy), I would like to suggest
that there is a growing gap between the discourses
circulating in transnational feminist networks,
politics at the national level and the way gender
relations, which are embedded in complex layers
of historical and cultural determination, are actually
played out in everyday livelihood contexts.
Debates within transnational feminist
constituencies over an appropriate politics of
solidarity with women in Afghanistan proved to be
quite divisive. These exchanges followed the familiar
tropes of women’s rights as universal human rights
vs. “feminism-as-imperialism”, reflected in a spate
of articles both in the popular press and in academic
journals (with evocative titles such as Feminism as
Imperialism, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?
and Imperial Wars or Benevolent Interventions?). While
some denounced intervention as an extension of
colonial meddling, others highlighted the hypocrisy
inherent in denying Muslim women their rights in
the name of cultural relativism. This is not to suggest
that global feminist mobilisation has been totally
without effect, but its results were often mixed.3
Whatever the role of international platforms and
actors, it is at the national level in struggles over
constitutional and citizenship rights that the most
important outcomes will materialise. A precarious
balance between contending forces bring
contradictory pressures to bear on women’s rights
in Afghanistan. On the one hand, institutions of
global governance, the UN system in particular,
demand compliance with the various international
conventions and standard-setting instruments that
underwrite women’s human rights. On the other
hand, some of the most powerful internal political
factions remain uncompromising on the matter of
Islamic laws and have been vocally opposed to
introducing changes in women’s status. The tug-
of-war between these tendencies is reflected in the
new Constitution of Afghanistan which
simultaneously endorses the various international
conventions to which the government is a signatory,
grants equal citizenship rights to men and women
and proclaims that no law can be in contradiction
with the holy religion of Islam (giving the Supreme
Court the right to revoke any law deemed to be so).
The potential tensions between these various clauses
will be played out in a political field where
technocratic blueprints for gender mainstreaming
(including the creation of national machinery – the
Ministry for Women’s Affairs, MWA), will have
relatively little purchase. In a fragmented polity
with a weak central government that lacks a
monopoly over the means of violence and without
a functioning judiciary system the very concept of
mainstreaming begs the question, unless it is
narrowly understood as a practice to be embraced
by donors in their own programming.
As donors, UN agencies and NGOs compete for
their share in the “gender” market, often draining
limited local capacity to staff their own projects in
the process, there is a risk that local voices (especially
non-English speaking ones) may be drowned out.
Donor packages for women’s empowerment can
easily miss their target in a context where the vast
majority of women have limited contact with the
institutions of the state, market or civil society. Yet,
there is little indication of efforts to look beyond
the mantras of capacity building, gender training
and mainstreaming as a means of addressing gender
inequity in the Afghan context. This, indeed, is a
context that seems to elicit diametrically opposed
reactions; either an unabashedly interventionist
stance (demanding the application of state-of-the-
art gender ‘packages’) or a defeatist posture
(invoking cultural sensitivity to endorse the status
quo). In either case, women activists who have been
fighting for their rights for a long time both in exile
abroad and in Afghanistan may end up as the losers,
either because they are deemed to lack the necessary
expertise or because they are seen as
unrepresentative of their own culture. 
A more creative engagement with the
complexities of the politics of gender, which is laden
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here as elsewhere with its own historical baggage,
would mandate a contextual, non-technocratic
approach which requires temporal horizons, levels
of commitment and types of coalition building and
collaboration that far exceed the time frames and
resources of “project” cycles. What emerges in the
absence of such commitment is, to paraphrase
Ignatieff who uses the term “nation-building lite”
to denote shallow interventions involving minimum
cost and risk, “feminism lite” which may
inadvertently expose and disempower the very
constituencies it seeks to support.
Notes
1. My own involvement in a UNIFEM (United Nations
Development Fund for Women) project in Afghanistan
between September 2003 and 2004 has prompted an
examination of the issues presented here.
2. There is little doubt that in both Afghanistan and Iraq,
elections are most likely to entrench the power of Islamist
forces that will resist an expansion of women’s rights
along the lines mandated by standard-setting instruments
such as CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all
forms of Discrimination Against Women). This simply
alerts us to the fact that in the real world of politics all
good things – national sovereignty, rule of law, democratic
governance and women’s rights – do not necessarily come
together.  
3. Feminist Majority’s ‘Campaign to Stop Gender Apartheid
in Afghanistan’ scored some US political victories for
Afghan women’s rights. Through a series of petitions and
lobbying activities they played a significant role in 1998
in the refusal by the UN and the USA to grant formal
recognition to the Taliban. It also put pressure to push
the US energy company Unocal out of a US$3 billion
venture to put a pipeline through Afghanistan, which
would have given the Taliban US$100 million royalties.
On the other hand, at a point in time when the Feminist
Majority was in alliance with the Revolutionary
Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) the
unveiling of a burqa-clad young representative of the
organisation in the midst of a reading by Oprah Winfrey
of Ensler’s The Vagina Monologues during a performance
in New York, represented precisely the type of
sensationalism and objectification which women
struggling for their rights inside Afghanistan could do
without.
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